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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
SPENCER VAN NOY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 8627 
RICHARD GIBBS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, 
RICHARD GIBBS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case are for the most part not disputed. 
On the 24th day of January, 1955, the Plaintiff and Respondent 
herein, Spencer Van Noy, hereinafter referred to as VanNoy, 
executed and delivered to the Defendant and Appellant, 
Richard Gibbs, hereinafter referred to as Gibbs, an Assign-
ment, Exhibit D-1 (R-87). By this Assignment, Van Noy 
purported to sell, transfer and assign all of his right, title and 
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interest to shares of capital stock in the Valley Amusement 
Enterprises, Incorporated, to Gibbs in consideration of the 
sum of Two Thousand Dollars ( $2,000.00), Seven Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ( $750.00) down, receipt of which was acknowl-
edged, and the balance, or Twelve Hundred Fifty Dollars 
$1,250.00) payable within ninety days. Gibbs received the 
Assignment, Exhibit 1, and paid the amount of Seven Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ( $750.00), on or about the 24th day of January, 
1955. The stock in the Valley Amusement Enterprises Cor-
poration which VanNoy purported to sell to Gibbs was never 
issued by the corporation to Mr. VanNoy (R-61) and was never 
delivered by Van Noy to Gibbs. Both VanNoy and Gibbs at 
the time the Assignment was executed believed that the Valley 
Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated, owned a leasehold in-
terest in certain property situated at 3 793 South State Street 
in Salt Lake City. The Articles of Incorporation of Valley 
Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated, were filed with the Sec-
retary of State on December 22, 1954. Spencer Van Noy sub-
scribed to Nineteen Hundred Fifty (1950) shares of stock of 
a par value of Nineteen Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1950.00) 
(R-89). The Articles of Incorporation recited that the capital 
stock of the corporation consisted of a lease dated the 1st day 
of December, 1953 covering the property located at 3793 
South State Street, Salt Lake City. Whatever monies Van Noy 
spent in the venture at the Copa Supper Club were expended 
in building and remodeling the building prior to the time of 
the incorporation of Valley Amusement Enterprises, Incor-
porated (R 54) and after the incorporation of Valley Amuse-
ment Company, Van Noy paid nothing into the corporation 
(R. 61). Van Noy first became interested in the Copa Supper 
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Club in September of 1954 (R-50). At the time Gibbs became 
mterested in the Copa Supper Club and Valley Amusement 
Company the premises at 3 793 South State were pretty well 
completed and decorated and the business was ready to open. 
At that point, the Plaintiff and the Defendant, together with 
others, had a meeting for the purpose of incorporating the 
Valley Amusement Company (R-53). Mr. Van Noy wanted 
so much for his investment and he agreed to take stock in 
the newly formed corporation for money and work which 
he had already expended on the leasehold at the Copa Supper 
Club (R-54). Van Noy acknowledged on the stand that at 
the time of the taking of his deposition that he thought there 
was a lease on the building (R-58). Subsequently it was de-
termined by Dr. Gibbs that there was no lease on the building 
and that there never had been. Gibbs was obtaining the out-
standing interests in the Valley Amusement Company for 
the purpose of obtaining the leasehold interest which both 
Gibbs and Van Noy thought existed on the premises, and he 
would not have purchased the same had he known the lease-
hold interest did not exist (R-76). Gibbs, through his counsel, 
offered to return the Assignment to Van Noy and accept his 
Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ( $750.00) back, which Van Noy 
refused to do (R-59). The evidence is uncontroverted that no 
leasehold existed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE 
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NO STOCK CERTIFICATES WERE DELIVERED OR 
TENDERED TO THE DEFENDANT AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 16-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, AND HAVING FAILED 
TO DELIVER THE CERTIFICATES THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
( 
Point II. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS 
CASE BECAUSE THERE WAS A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF 
FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF A LEASEHOLD IN-
TEREST WHICH WAS THE ONLY SUPPOSED ASSET 
OF THE VALLEY AMUSEMENT COMPANY AND SUCH 
LEASE DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE FORMA-
TION OF THE CORPORATION OR AT ANY TIME, 
WHICH RESULTED IN A TOTAL FAILURE OF CON-
SIDERATION FOR THE CONTRACT. 
Point III. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON DEFENDANT'S 
COUNTER-CLAIM FOR THE REASON THAT THERE 
WAS A TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AND 
THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE WAS ENTITLED TO 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE 
NO STOCK CERTIFICATES WERE DELIVERED OR 
TENDERED TO THE DEFENDANT AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 16-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, AND HAVING FAILED 
TO DELIVER THE CERTIFICATES THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
Section 16-3-1 U.C.A. 1953 provides the exclusive manner 
for transfer of shares of stock in a corporation. This Section 
reads in part as follows: 
"Title to a certificate and to the shares represented 
thereby can be transferred only: 
( 1) By delivery of the certificate indorsed either in 
blank or to a specified person by the person appearing 
by the certificate to be the owner of the shares rep-
resented thereby; or 
( 2) By delivery of the certificate and a separate docu-
ment containing a written assignment of the certificate 
or a power of attorney to sell, assign or transfer the 
same or the shares represented thereby. Such assignment 
or power of attorney may be either in blank or to a 
specified person. * * * '' 
An attempted transfer of shares of stock without delivery 
of the certificate is governed by Section 16-3-10 U.C.A. 1953, 
which reads as follows: 
"An attempted transfer of title to a certificate or to 
the shares represented thereby without delivery of the 
certificate shall have the effect of a promise to transfer, 
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and the obligation, if any, imposed by such promise 
shall be determined by the law governing the formation 
and performance of contracts." 
These Sections of law must be considered to be incorporated 
into and become part of every contract for the sale of cor-
porate stock. Makris vs. Melis, 50 Utah 544, 167 P. 802-804. 
The evidence in the case at bar indicates conclusively that 
the Plaintiff cannot deliver the certificate of stock as required 
by law. The subscription to the 1950 shares of stock which 
Van Noy made was supposedly paid for by work and services 
performed in the construction and building of the Copa Supper 
Club prior to the incorporation of Valley Amusement Cor-
poration. Had the lease been in existence, such work performed 
upon the leasehold interest would, no doubt, increase the 
value of the leasehold and become a proper subject for transfer 
into the corporation in consideration for the issuance for its 
shares of stock. However, in this case, no leasehold existed 
and therefore Van Noy is not entitled to have the shares of 
stock issued to him. Furthermore, the trial court recognized 
this by requiring the Plaintiff in this case to deliver the cer-
tificate or certificates of stock of the Valley Amusement Enter-
prises Corporation to the Defendant. Inasmuch as no certificates 
were delivered, nor can they be delivered, Section 16-3-10 
U.C.A. 1953, heretofore quoted, would govern and the Plain-
tiff before bringing his cause of action would be required 
to tender delivery of the shares of stock or show that he 
could deliver the shares before bringing his lawsuit or before 
having a cause of action against the Defendant. Section 16-3-10 
U.C.A. requires under the conditions existing m this case 
that the obligation to transfer the shares shall be governed 
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by the law governing the formation and performance of 
contracts generally. That Plaintiff is required to deliver the 
certificates, under the facts of this case, we believe is governed 
by Section 60-3-2 U.C.A. 1953, which provides as follows: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and 
payment of the price are concurrent conditions; that is 
to say, the seller must be ready and willing to give 
possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for 
the price, and the buyer must be ready and willing to 
pay the price in exchange for possession of the goods." 
Thus we see under this Section the Plaintiff is obligated 
before having a cause of action to tender delivery of the 
shares of stock or the certificates of the shares of stock to the 
Defendant, which the evidence shows in this case clearly was 
not done. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court 
of Utah in the case of Rock vs. Gustavson Oil Company, 204 
Pac. 96. The Court considered a case in which there had been 
a failure to deliver the stock certificates as required by the 
contract. The Court held: 
"Under our statute, Section 878 Compiled Laws, 1917, 
shares of stock in a corporation are deemed personal 
property. The certificates issued therefor are the evi-
dence or muniments of title. Due performance of a 
contract of sale on the part of the seller of stock ordi-
narily imports and requires a delivery of a certificate 
to the buyer and until that is done by the seller the 
transaction will not be regarded as a completed one. 
Corey Adm'r. v. Perry Irr. Co., 50 Utah 70; 166 Pac. 
672. Makris v. Melis, 50 Utah, 544, 167 Pac. 802." 
The Defendant in this case believes in view of the fore-
going facts that it will be impossible for the Plaintiff to comply 
with the order of the Court below and deliver the shares 
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of stock as required by the court order. We submit that a 
reading of the Order recognizes in principle that the delivery 
of the shares of stock and the payment of the price are con-
current conditions, as heretofore set forth, and that in view 
of this the action was premature! y brought. The Court should 
reverse the judgment of the lower court and hold that no cause 
of action existed against the Defendant in this case. 
Point II. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS 
CASE BECAUSE THERE WAS A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF 
FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF A LEASEHOLD IN-
TEREST WHICH WAS THE ONLY SUPPOSED ASSET 
OF THE VALLEY AMUSEMENT COMPANY AND SUCH 
LEASE DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE FORMA-
TION OF THE CORPORATION OR AT ANY TIME, 
WHICH RESULTED IN A TOTAL FAILURE OF CON-
SIDERATION FOR THE CONTRACT. 
The Plaintiff Van Noy and others were engaged in the 
construction of the premises at 3 793 South State for the purpose 
of operating a non-profit social club, the Copa Supper Club. 
Having invested sums of money, it was the desire of all of 
the persons then engaged to form a corporation to hold the 
supposed leasehold interest in the property and lease the same 
to the Copa Supper Club. The Defendant Gibbs was the only 
one who furnished money after the formation of the Valley 
Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated, and the only one of 
10 
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whom it can be said paid his subscription to the stock sub-
scribed in Valley Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated. The 
Plaintiff and the Defendant had discussed the question of 
purchasing each other's interest in the club prior to the time 
the Assignment which is the subject matter of this lawsuit 
was executed. The testimony of both indicates that the thing 
they were dealing with was the Copa Supper Club and that 
they were intending to transfer this interest by the transfer of 
the shares of stock. Both were under the impression that the 
corporation was validly formed; that the leasehold interest ex-
isted; that the Valley Amusement Company was in a position 
to lease the premises to the Copa Supper Club and thereby to 
operate the business into which all of the incorporators had 
invested their money. Gibbs accepted the assignment with 
the understanding that he was obtaining the leasehold interest. 
Van Noy made the Assignment believing that the Valley 
Amusement Company had the leasehold interest and the right 
to operate the Copa Supper Club. In fact, it was the interest 
in the Copa Supper Club with which the parties were intending 
to deal. The Plaintiff so testified (R-42). In truth and in fact 
such lease was not in existence and in accepting the Assign-
ment of the shares of stock the Defendant received nothing 
and there was a total failure of consideration. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Kentucky in the case 
of Neale vs. Wright, 130 Ky. 146. 112 SW. 1115, considered 
"- situation almost identical to the case at bar. In that case, one 
director of a corporation sold land to another director for 
stock in the corporation. Both parties were greatly deceived 
as to the value of the stock by the books of the corporation, 
11 
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which indicated an inventory far in excess of that which 
actually existed. The Court ordered the deed to the 1and can-
celled, and held: 
'Persons who deal in the stock of a corporation 
necessarily enter into speculative contracts and they 
will not be ordinarily released simply because the stock 
turned out to be worth less than it was supposed to be 
worth, but here the stock which Neal transferred to 
Wright for the land was of no value. As the facts 
proved, he received no consideration for his land. The 
parties were dealing upon the supposition that the 
corporation had about four times as much merchandise 
as it in fact had. Their trade was made upon the sup-
posed condition of the corporation. There was a mutual 
mistake induced by the statements of the condition of 
the corporation which had been promulgated. They 
were both deceived, but when the truth appears and 
it is shown that there is a total failure of consideration 
for the deed it will be cancelled in equity." 
In the case at bar, both parties were greatly deceived with 
regard to the existence of the lease. In the Articles of Incor-
poration (R-95) the leasehold was transferred to the corpora-
tion by agreement of the incorporators. The Articles of In-
corporation were signed by both parties to this agreement and 
both understood that the lease was in existence. Van Noy 
had been working on the premises remodeling and building 
the same and had paid rent on the premises for a period of 
some months prior to the formation of the Valley Amusement 
Company. We submit that in view of these facts that there 
was a mutual mistake which was induced by the Articles of 
Incorporation, if by nothing else. Now, after the truth appears, 
to-wit, that no leasehold existed, the Plaintiff would recover 
12 
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from the Defendant the balance of the amount paid even 
though under such facts there is a total failure of consideration 
and that the contract is voidable having been entered into 
under a mistake of a material fact. See Restatement of Con-
tracts, Section 502, which states in part: 
· · * * * Where parties on entering into a transaction 
that affects their contractural relations are both under 
a mistake regarding a fact assumed by them as the 
basis on which they entered into the transaction it is 
voidable, * * * '' 
Under Comment A, the following appears: 
·'Where both parties assume the existence of a 
certain state of facts as the basis on which they enter 
into a transaction, the transaction can be avoided by a 
party who is harmed if the assumption is erroneous." 
Here the parties were intending to deal with what was 
known as the Copa Supper Club. Certainly the Plaintiff in 
this case assumed that there was a lease inasmuch as he spent 
considerable sums of money and performed a considerable 
amount of labor in improving the leasehold. The Defendant 
Gibbs assumed a lease existed and what he was intending to 
purchase was the lease in order that he might lease the premises 
to the Copa Supper Club. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington tn the 
case of Lindeburg vs. Murray, 201 Pac. 759, considered a 
case similar to the one at bar. In that case, stock in a cor-
poration was sold in the belief by both parties that the assets 
of the corporation were as shown by the books of the cor-
poration. A defalcation of the bookkeeper had caused a material 
13 
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reduction in the assets of the company. The Washington Court 
held: 
''We think it is elementary that where there is a clear 
bona fide mistake regarding material facts without 
culpable negligence on the part of the person com-
plaining the contract may be avoided and equity will 
decree a recision." 
"We take it that the true test in cases involving 
mutual mistake of fact is whether the contract would 
have been entered into had there been no mistake." 
The Court in that case allowed recision of the contract 
for the purchase of the stock. In the case at bar, as in the 
Washington case, there is a clear bona fide case of a material 
fact. The Plaintiff in this case cannot, therefore, recover the 
balance of the money which the Defendant agreed to pay 
by reason of the Assignment of the shares of stock. 
Point III. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON DEFENDANT'S 
COUNTER-CLAIM FOR THE REASON THAT THERE 
WAS A TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AND 
THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE WAS ENTITLED TO 
RESCIND THE CONTRACT AND RECEIVE BACK THE 
AMOUNT PAID. 
The Defendant, through its counsel of record, offered to 
return the Assignment and asked for the Seven Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($750.00) which had been paid to be returned. 
This tender was refused ( R-59). Under the facts, the reasoning 
14 
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and the authorities heretofore set forth, the Defendant is 
entitled to rescind and receive back the amounts paid. This, 
we submit, is true because there was a mutual mistake of a 
material fact and a total failure of consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence is undisputed in this case that the stock certifi-
cates in the Valley Amusement Company were never issued and 
were never delivered by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. The evi-
dence established conclusively that the Valley Amusement Enter-
prises, Incorporated, did not have the leasehold on the premises 
located at 3 793 South State Street, which was the subject 
matter of the transaction. We submit now that it would be 
unreasonable to require the Defendant to pay for nothing 
more than a piece of paper, to-wit, the assignment of shares 
of stock which in truth and in fact the Plaintiff did not own, 
having failed to pay his subscription into the corporation. 
We respectfully submit that in view of the foregoing authori-
ties and reasoning that the judgment of the lower court should 
be set aside and a judgment of no cause of action entered in 
favor of the Defendant Richard Gibbs and that the Defendant 
be allowed to recover on his counter-claim the amount paid, 
he being enittled under the facts of this case to rescind the 
contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G. Hal Taylor of the firm of 
TAYLOR, LUND AND GRIFFITH 
Attorneys for Defendant Richard Gibbs 
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